Visible light communication (VLC) is one of the newest technologies that has been developed for short and middle range data communication, as a commercial solution is predicted to have a considerable market penetration in the near future due to the advantages the technology brings. VLC provides a flexible communication channel that, according to the standard [2], allows data transfer rates ranging from 11.67 kb/s to 96 Mb/s.

Among the multiple benefits that VLC is supposed to bring into the market is the inherited security of the technology. This assumed security is based on the premise that (indoor) light data streams cannot be captured from outside users.

The work, “Study and Validation of Eavesdropping Scenarios over a Visible Light Communication Channel”, conducted by Ignacio Marin-Garcia, Victor Guerra and Rafael Perez-Jimenez proposed the study of eavesdropping on a VLC link. To accurately assess the possibilities of such an attack, simulations and practical experiments were performed.

The results seem to validate that it is possible to eavesdrop on a VLC-based channel from outside the premises and proved the validity of using geometrical considerations to define potential attacks zones.

Published online 2017 Nov 21. doi: 10.3390/s17112687

Source: PMC US National Library of Medicine

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